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Qualifier Challenge - KPRCA_00048


Original Versions

Known Vulnerabilities

  • CWE-122 - Heap-based Buffer Overflow
  • CWE-131 - Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size
  • CWE-476 - NULL Pointer Dereference
  • CWE-788 - Access of Memory Location After End of Buffer
  • CWEs are listed as indicated by the challenge author.

Scores

  • DeepRed: 1.75
  • ForAllSecure: 1.42
  • Disekt: 0.01
  • CodeJitsu: 0.0
  • TECHx: 0.0
  • Shellphish: 0.0
  • CSDS: 0.0
  • FuzzBOMB: 0.0
  • TrailofBits: 0.0
  • The maximum score for each challenge in CQE is 4, following the CQE Scoring Document.

Passed consensus evaluation

Proved a POV in reference challenge

Defense against reference POVs

No submission

  • Eighth Place Team
  • Eleventh Place Team
  • Fifth Place Team - Finalist
  • First Place Team - Finalist
  • Fourth Place Team - Finalist
  • Ninth Place Team
  • Second Place Team - Finalist
  • Seventh Place Team - Finalist
  • Sixth Place Team - Finalist
  • Tenth Place Team
  • Third Place Team - Finalist
  • Thirteenth Place Team
  • Twelfth Place Team

All Submissions

DARPA performer group

Kaprica Security (KPRCA)

Description:

This service implements and command-line client challenge binary and server challenge binary for a simple key-value store. The client reads input from the users, performs some perfunctory validity checks on the user issued command, encodes the command, passes it via IPC to the server challenge binary, and finally displays the result to the user. If the command entered by the user is unknown the user is adequately admonished and an error is returned. The keys are stored in a binary search tree which allows for easy and efficient in-order traversal, removal, and insertion.

Feature List

The following commands are supported by the server.

  • append: Append a value to a key.

  • auth: Authorize the client to the server, this must be done before any other commands can be issued.

  • bitcount: Return the number of bits set in the value store at a key.

  • bitop: Perform XOR, OR, AND, or NOT between 2 or 1 keys, depending on the action, and store the result in another key.

  • decr: Convert the value at a key to an integer if it is not already one and decrease its value by 1.

  • del: Delete a key from the server if it exists.

  • exists: Return a boolean value that states whether or not a key exists in the server.

  • get: Return the value stored at a key.

  • incr: Convert the value at a key to an integer if it is not already one and increase its value by 1.

  • keys: Return a list of the keys currently stored in the server.

  • rename: Move the value stored at one key to another key.

  • set: Set the value of a key.

Vulnerability

The first vulnerability for this service occurs in the server. When generating the current list keys stored in the server the code that resizes the working-data buffer when it grows to it's capacity incorrectly calculates the required size that the buffer must grow to. The incorrect size is 4 bytes too small. Under the right circumstances this can cause heap corruption and result in a segmentation fault, i.e. if our malloc() implementation returns a block that is exactly the requested size or if the black is later split.

The second vulnerability for this service occurs in the server. When performing a bitop of type 'AND' to two keys, if one of the keys referenced by the command given by the user does not exist as a key within the server then a null pointer dereference will occur.

Generic class of vulnerability

  • Buffer overflow
  • In correct buffer size calculation
  • Heap overflow
  • NULL pointer dereference

CWE classification

  • CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow
  • CWE-131: Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size
  • CWE-788: Access of Memory Location After End of Buffer
  • CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference

Challenges

The challenge binary poses tests the following abilities of a system:

  • Ability to handle and reason about client-server modeled IPC.
  • Ability to handle nuanced dynamic memory allocation issues

Curated by Lunge Technology, LLC. Questions or comments? Send us email